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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF WATER RESOURCES, WATER SUPPLY AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL SANITATION
The cluster approach to humanitarian response: 
lessons from the Pakistan earthquake
William L. Fellows, UNICEF Regional Office for South Asia
A brief history of the cluster approach
Going back to the 1984/5 drought/famine in Ethiopia and 
Sudan the humanitarian response was generally conceived 
of being composed of food and non-food items. This was 
formalized in 1989 with the commencement of Operation 
Lifeline in Southern Sudan with World Food Programme 
(WFP) being given lead responsibility for food and the United 
Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) having responsibility 
for non-food items.
As emergencies became more complicated, and our under-
standing of the needs of the affected population improved, 
the complexity of the response also increased. Improved 
understanding of protection issues and the need for continuing 
education greatly expanded the non-food sector until it was 
no longer practical for one agency to coordinate.
The concept of lead agencies came out the practical dif-
ficulties of coordinating such a large and complex response. 
The number of partners during this period was also increasing 
dramatically further complicating the task of coordination. 
As preparation began for what seemed to be an increasingly 
inevitable war in Iraq UNICEF was appointed the lead agency 
for Water and Sanitation and led the contingency planning 
process. This role continued in Baghdad, Basra, and Erbil 
immediately after the invasion.
In December of 2003 after the second bombing of the Canal 
Hotel in Baghdad the United Nations Family working in Iraq 
met in Amman in a three day workshop to work out how 
it could continue to work effectively in Iraq with as light a 
foot print as possible. The need to effectively coordinate the 
response was very evident to all participants. In order to form 
working groups the response was divided into ten sectors 
with UNICEF being asked to leads the water and sanitation 
cluster. The United Nations Development Assistance Frame-
work was used to produce a work plan by cluster.
It should be noted that the exercise that developed the 
cluster concept was an internal UN exercise but the effec-
tiveness of the approach was quickly demonstrated by how 
quickly the broader humanitarian community bought into 
it. For the next two years communication with the various 
governments of Iraq and work plans were developed through 
and by the clusters. 
Given the realities of working on the ground in Iraq the 
WATSAN cluster was to a very large extent a virtual one. 
While physically meetings took place regularly in Amman 
and Kuwait many members of the cluster were not able to 
attend meetings on a routine basis so discussions took place 
via the internet, all plans circulated and developed with input 
from the field and many decisions taken only after feedback 
from the field had been received.
Not everyone involved in Humanitarian work in Iraq 
participated in this initial attempt at a cluster approach. 
Notable the US military and large US contractors however 
coordination with these organizations was still possible to a 
degree through the lead agency approach. UNICEF having 
also been appointed the lead agency for water and sanita-
tion was able to obtain official plans and budgets and while 
not being able to influence them to a very great degree we 
were able to at least minimizing duplication. The fact the 
USAID was funding a senior WES post to interalia coordi-
nate the sector probably helped. It should be noted however 
that the British, Italian, Polish and Japanese Military were 
very active cluster members as well as the principle British 
contractors. This was due in part to their more manageable 
size and their ready access to Kuwait where an active arm 
of the cluster was operating.
In 2005 a Humanitarian Response Review was launched 
by the Emergency Relief Coordinator to assess the humani-
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tarian response capacities of the UN, NGOs, Red Cross/Red 
Crescent Movement and other key humanitarian actors. 
The team looked at complex and major emergencies and 
considered preparedness and response capacities. Due to 
time constraints they focused on the international response 
capacity in the initial phase of an emergency.
One of the key findings of this report, issued in August of 
2005 was that “The clear discrepancies between declared and 
actual capacities in water and sanitation need urgent atten-
tion. While there is an almost ritualistic acknowledgement 
of the importance of the Sphere Standards, many agencies 
lack the capacity to implement these requirements. The 
main elements needed to make  an immediate impact on 
preparedness and response capacities in the sector has to 
be translated into commitment, starting with an active and 
clearly recognized leadership.
The report identified areas where there were clear gaps n 
the capacity to respond. There was originally no cluster pro-
posed for food, education or originally health (although this 
was added by the insistence of WHO). There was however 
no controversy over the reports recommendation that the 
capacity of the Watsan sector needed to improve.
One of the key recommendations of the report is “In terms 
of sector coordination, the report recommends the assignment 
of clear responsibilities to lead organizations at sector level, 
with a priority in relation to the protection and care of IDPs 
and the development of cluster models between networks at 
the sectoral, regional, and local levels. This is what we now 
know as the cluster approach.
Subsequent to the report the Inter-Agency Standing 
Committee assigning the task of Watsan leadership to 
UNICEF.
Rolling out the approach
This brings us to October 2005. The OCHA team arriving 
from Geneva, fully aware of all of the preceding develop-
ments recommended to the UN Coordinator (who was later 
to also be appointed Humanitarian Coordinator) and through 
him to the UN Country Team that the cluster approach be 
adopted. A famous quote from a senior member official of 
OCHA to the United Nations Disaster Management Meeting 
on October 11th was “The IASC Principals have decided 
that the cluster approach will be implemented in the Pakistan 
Emergency. Is this clear?” Since almost no one in the room 
had ever heard of the cluster approach it was of course as 
clear as mud.
Given that this was the first time that the cluster approach 
was being officially rolled out, with very little clarity and 
no prior training there were understandably teething prob-
lems still much good came out of the process. The cluster 
immediately provided a structure around which to develop 
the consolidated appeal. The initial consolidated appeal was 
launched within 72 hours of the earthquake, the fastest that 
such an appeal had ever been issued.
The joint experience of the cluster members was also a great 
asset in the initial phase of the emergency. The ability to draw 
on this wide range of experience meant that we did not need 
to constantly reinvent the wheel. One member who had been 
in Banda ache recommended we use the assessment form 
that had been used there. This form was obtained, translated 
and distributed to all members within days. Another recom-
mended that reporting formats developed in Darfur would 
be most appropriate for use in Pakistan. Again these forms 
were obtained, modified and distributed within days. 
Though dialog and discussion a prioritized strategy was 
agreed upon by the sector to which all members could work. 
There was some coordinated response of the actors in the 
field and a unified report produced from the sector.
An interesting feature of the cluster approach over the lead 
agency approach was the involvement of donor agencies, at 
least at national level. This gave them equal input into the 
development of priorities and approaches and a much better 
understanding of the challenges and the needs of the sector. 
To a certain degree this changed the dynamic between them 
and the implementing agencies on the ground creating much 
more of a team effort rather than donor-recipient relationship. 
The support that they provided to the cluster coordinator 
greatly enhanced his ability to coordinate activities as it 
was obvious to all if any agency was acting in coordination 
with the cluster.
As an indication of effectiveness, at the 6 week mark of 
the emergency a USAID evaluation found that  “with few 
exceptions, UN agencies were inadequate to the task in the 
weeks immediately following Pakistan’s earthquake” but 
found “UNICEF was performing reasonably well as the 
lead agency for water and sanitation”.
Constraints and opportunities
The most notably being that while the cluster was very quick 
to function at the national level it was much slower to get 
established at sub-national level. This was due in part to the 
difficulty of the emergency and the time it took to realize this 
and partly due to the fact that we are still learning exactly 
how much time and energy must be devoted specifically to 
cluster coordination was in the initial stage was seriously 
underestimated.
Another related to the size and difficulty of the emergency 
was the very significant gaps that emerged. One thing that a 
cluster approach can do is to maximize the efficiency of your 
capacity it does not in and of itself increase the capacity you 
have on the ground. A great deal of criticism was level at the 
cluster when people were found to be lacking services. This 
was usually due to simply a lack of capacity on the ground 
not a lack of coordination. Government capacity was greatly 
crippled by the earthquake and the NGO (and to be fair the 
UN) were not to scale. A lot of the NGOs that responded 
did more than just water and sanitation and given the gen-
eral lack of capacity on the ground Watsan was in constant 
competition with shelter and food. Given the situation this 
might have actually been the correct decision.
It is unfortunate that it took a couple of disease outbreaks 
to get people to understand the magnitude of the problem but 
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they did get peoples attention. Capacity of several NGOs, 
most notably Oxfam, as well as UNICEF increased signifi-
cantly after these outbreaks but there was still not enough 
resources to do everything everywhere. The scale of the 
problem was simply enormous.
The final failure related to the scale of the problem was 
the lack of a comprehensive assessment despite a common 
assessment tool agreed upon by the cluster and used by 
many in the field. Urban areas were generally effectively 
assessed, IDP camps greater that 50 tents were effectively 
assessed and select areas where various NGOs visited were 
effectively assessed but this left somewhere between one 
and three million people un-assessed, a pretty large margin 
of error even for an emergency the size of the Pakistan 
Earthquake. It is amazing that in this day and age anyone 
would show up at a disaster without a GPS but people did 
not have them.
One of the things that the cluster approach is not intended 
to be is an alternative government. The existence of this 
approach does not absolve the government from its duty 
to provide safe water and a healthy environment to its 
people nor is responsibility to coordinate such a response. 
One of the greatest failures of the Watsan cluster at central 
level in Pakistan was our failure to effectively engage the 
Government. This was in part due to the lack of a clear 
central ministry with overarching responsibility for water 
and sanitation and partly due to the lack of any equivalent 
structure in the Pakistan military that played a leading role 
in the national responce.
Another issue that is still being debated and on which 
there is still a lack of understanding is the issue of “Agency 
of Last Resort”. Some interpret this to mean that it should 
not be the agency of first resort while others felt that it was 
responsible for doing everything that could not be done by 
others. In any emergency it is imperative that whoever is 
best placed to respond quickly does so. However, it is very 
important that the Cluster coordinator be able to separate 
his/her role as coordinator from that of her/his agency. As 
Cluster Coordinator you represent the sector not your agency 
and you must be able to ensure that capabilities are maximized 
regardless of which agency this is. It is also important that 
the mandate of the coordinator extend to that of the sector 
and all aspects of the response be considered regardless of 
the mandate of the agency.
Still in both Iraq and Pakistan it was never envisioned that 
adequate water and sanitation would be provided to all. In 
any resource constrained situation priorities must be set and 
tough decisions made. In Pakistan the initial priorities were 
people high in the mountains who did not wish to leave, 
urban areas and large camps. Even after this prioritization 
it was not possible to get assistance to everyone in these 
categories so the idea of anyone being able to provide all 
resources required is simply not practical. It is however 
incumbent on the cluster that the greatest number are given 
the greatest good with the resources available.
What makes for an effective coordinator?
Then what are the attributes of an effective cluster coordina-
tor? Certainly the person must have sufficient experience 
and maturity to be respected by all partners. Each and every 
emergency will be unique and each and every response will 
be unique so the cluster coordinator must have a range of 
experience and the flexibility to develop new approaches 
and adapt to a changing environment. 
The coordinator must be prepared to work long hours 
under difficult circumstances to build an effective team, 
s/he must be willing to lead by example. This also means 
being sensitive to the diversity of the group, in particular 
local NGOs who will have the most on the ground experi-
ence but may not be able to articulate this experience in a 
meeting easily.
The coordinator must be articulate and be able to com-
municate effectively the needs of the entire sector to other 
clusters while not losing sight of the overall picture. The 
coordinator must be an effective advocate on behalf of the 
sector with the donors and the media but s/he must have broad 
shoulders and be willing to accept criticism. The coordinator 
must be able to differentiate the needs of the lead agency 
from the needs of the sector and make decisions based on 
the greater good of the sector but as far as the failures of the 
sector are concerned “the buck stops” with the coordinator. 
Where ever possible the coordinator should not have any 
direct implementative responsibility.
The coordinator must be decisive and must be willing to 
on occasion offend people. Lives are at risk and when an 
agency is not performing tough decisions must be made. g
The coordinator must be a facilitator, fully capable of get-
ting all the partners to work together to agree upon strategies, 
priorities, plans and budgets. Last and certainly not least the 
coordinator must be able to effectively chair a meeting. This 
process unfortunately requires a lot of meetings, particularly 
at the initial stages, and there is nothing worse than, while 
children’s lives are at risk, to be sitting through a poorly 
chaired meeting. 
The future of the cluster
Given the complexity of the process that has lead to the 
cluster approach and the speed with which it has taken root 
it seems safe to say that is it with us for a while. UNICEF is 
taking its global responsibility very seriously coordinating 
a global working group in Geneva. Preparations for mov-
ing to a cluster approach are well underway for three pilot 
countries, Liberia, DRC and Uganda and other countries are 
bring considered. It is therefore imperative for the wellbeing 
of millions of women and children (as well as men) that we 
do the best that we can.
What should participating agencies expect out of the cluster 
approach? They should expect effective leadership which is 
familiar with and has been trained in the cluster approach but 
more importantly they should expect leadership with respect 
for their capacity. Ultimately it will be the agencies on the 
ground who will determine if a response is successful or not, 
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not the effectiveness of the meetings. They should have a 
significant say into all decision being taken by the cluster, 
when they disagree they must have the right to register that 
disagreement. They should be able to expect clear roles and 
responsibilities with little or no duplication and overlap. 
They should be able to expect that the cluster will reach 
out to them. Local NGOs in particular will have to have the 
process explained to them and be encouraged to participate. 
The cluster should to the extent possible come to them. It 
took some time in Pakistan to fully understand the manpower 
requirements of the cluster approach and to recruit effective 
coordinators at sub-national level. This should happen much 
more quickly in the future.
The Cluster must be able to provide clearly agreed upon 
strategies, priorities, workplans and allocation of resources. 
In the future the over riding frame of the consolidated appeal 
must be strengthened if we are to have a coordinated response 
and this can only happen will all partners participating. 
Agreed upon assessment formats which can be quickly and 
simply used by all must be agreed upon in advance. Report-
ing formats that are quick and easy to use must be rapidly 
modified and used by all.  The reporting structure also needs 
to be clear to all, it makes no sense to ask an agency to report 
to the district Watsan coordinator, the district humanitarian 
coordinator, the national Watsan coordinator and the national 
humanitarian coordinator and yet the different work done 
by different agencies must not be lost in the process so that 
capacities can be mapped and gaps identified.
Finally NGOs should expect an over all net benefit from 
participating. They should expect useful information to be 
provided to them. They should expect facilitation with the 
development of their plans and proposals. They should expect 
assistance with the donors to raise money and they should 
expect to get credit for the work that they do.
An area that clearly still needs some additional capacity 
developed is in the area of hygiene education. There are 
several broad approaches to this topic, mass media, social 
marketing, and participatory approaches and as in other areas 
of the sector the debate at times breaks down in to either or 
debates. It is of paramount importance that we not use one 
approach or another but rather that we use all approaches. 
This will normally mean that a team will need to be assembled 
as it is rare to find any individual with all of the required 
skills. However as with other aspect of the response, time 
is of the essence. Messages must be quickly agreed upon, 
mass media quickly engaged, rapid assessments conducted 
rapidly, participatory tools quickly developed and put into 
the hands of the community along with the training to use 
them with in days not weeks or months.
Conclusion
There is still much work to do if the Cluster approach is 
going to prove effective. The approach is still in the process 
of being defined and is still poorly understood. The process 
of developing the tools and capacity to implement them is 
under way at a global level and there is much potential in the 
approach but if it is to become more than just potential the 
broader humanitarian community must buy into the process. 
UNICEF can lead but ultimately its success or failure is in 
the hands of our partners.
This paper is dedicated to the memory of the brave men 
and women who have sacrificed their lives in Iraq providing 
water and sanitation to the children of Iraq. 
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